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DIMACS Theory of Computing Seminar

Optimal and Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design Beyond a Single Dimension

Ariel Schvartzman, Rutgers/DIMACS

Location:  TBA
Date & time: Wednesday, 09 September 2020 at 11:00AM - 12:00PM

Abstract: How should a seller price items when facing a single buyer in order to maximize the seller's revenue? In seminal work, Myerson showed that it suffices to post a single, deterministic price in order to extract the optimal revenue. Incredibly, the result still holds even if the seller is selling n identical copies of the same item. Unfortunately, this beautiful result fails to generalize beyond a single item: even for two non-identical goods, there exist distributions for which a seller might have to present uncountably many options in order to extract the full revenue!

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