Seminars & Colloquia Calendar
Simultaneous Communication Complexity of Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions
Matt Weinberg: Princeton University
Location: CoRE 301
Date & time: Wednesday, 25 January 2017 at 11:00AM - 11:11AM
(Allocation Problem): partition [m] into A sqcup B in order to maximize max_i {A cap A_i} + max_j {B cap B_j}.(Decision Problem): decide whether there exists an i, j, such that A_i cup B_ j geq C.
For interactive protocols, a (tight) 3/4-approximation is known in poly(m) communication for both problems. We show the following:
- A randomized, simultaneous protocol with O(m) communication that achieves a (tight) 3/4-approximation for the allocation problem.
- No randomized, simultaneous protocol with subexponential (in m) communication guarantees better than a 3/4-1/108 approximation for the decision problem.
I'll further discuss the implications of these results for truthful combinatorial auctions due to a recent result of Dobzinski [FOCS 16].
Joint work with Mark Braverman and Jieming Mao.